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The advent of the Internet has radically transformed the way in which images of
fine art can be viewed by much of the world. One of Amedeo Modigliani’s rarely seen
portraits of Jeanne Hébuterne, an oil-on-canvas painting done in 1919, can be seen on the
website Artnet.com.1 It can also be seen in a photograph of a Christie’s porter handling
the original painting on the Getty Images’ website.2 And, since the painting did not sell
for the auction’s reserve, or minimum, sale price, the painting is presumably back with
the owners who put it up for auction, and can be seen in person at their home.
The image of Edgar Degas’ Dancers in Blue, a pastel work done in the late 1890s,
can be seen on the Corbis website,3 as well as on a poster sales website4 that is
advertising the image. Or, to view this work in person, one could visit the Pushkin
Museum in Moscow.5 New technology is constantly challenging human perceptions of
how and whether a new mechanism for a traditional activity is permissible in society.
The manner in which the law translates new technology can be awkward and contentious.
This writing will examine how and whether various types of images can be viewed and
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used in non-traditional formats, and address some of the issues for which domestic and
international laws have needed to adjust their traditional tenets.
This topic is extremely broad and complex. A large portion of the intersecting
interests between the Internet, fine art and technology regards the doctrine of fair use in
copyright law, which provides a legal defense to the usage of copyrighted works for
purposes of education, for example. Whether a copyrighted online image could be used
for a professor’s PowerPoint presentation would fall into this realm of inquiry. This
writing will focus on the rights and responsibilities the groups of people involved in
online imagery; those who are depicted, those who create the image, those who own the
copyright, those who own the original artwork itself, and those who view it.
To provide a framework in which to understand these issues, I will provide an
outline in Part I of selected international copyright regimes. In Part II, I will briefly touch
on the importance of choice of law analyses, and will look at rights of privacy and rights
of publicity in their historic context and will discuss new challenges that confront current
laws in these domains in the context of the Internet. In Part III, I will analyze moral
rights as they are understood by various nations, and how they are being interpreted in
tandem with the Internet. In Part IV, I will discuss the opportunities and difficulties
faced by advances in digital rights management. In Part V, I will synthesize the prior
analyses by means of the example of a single artist and, in Part VI, the conclusion, I will
suggest that, while harmonization of international copyright law seems, a priori, the most
beneficial plan for the future, there may be alternative systems that are more realistic and
more beneficial. The ideal system could provide clear rules to copyright holders as to
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their bundle of rights in a given jurisdiction and how to enforce them, and preserve the
deep-seated ideological underpinnings of copyright law in individual countries. If
harmonization does occur at some point, I would recommend that artist’s rights be an
important part of the discussion.
I.

International Copyright Regimes
Prior to the first international bilateral copyright treaty’s implementation in the

middle of the nineteenth century, France called for a universal law of copyright.6 It was
the case then, and still is today, that “[a]ll nations’ domestic laws reflect internal values,
mores, and social conditions. Copyright laws are no exception.”7 Although international
copyright protection legislation still does not exist today, signatories to the Convention
for the protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland,
have increased steadily since the Convention’s inception. The ten original signatory
countries8 to the Convention comprised the Berne Union;9 an entity that exists apart from
the treaty so that no Union member need adhere to any revisions of the Convention in
order to remain Berne Union members. There are currently 154 state members of the
Berne Union.10
Essentially, the jurisdictional component of the Berne Convention, most recently
revised in 1971, is based on a principle of national treatment, wherein a copyrighted work
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from any Berne Union country will be treated in any other country according to the
latter’s copyright law. For example, a French artwork that is infringed in Germany will
be protected in Germany at least to the extent that a German work would be protected
there.11 A tenet of the Berne Convention that has made it attractive to so many countries
is its relative leniency insofar as it allows member States to maintain much autonomy in
implementing the Convention and accommodates diversity in national laws.12 Another
key element of the Berne Convention, at least insofar as the United States’ recent
implementation of it is concerned, is its requirement of moral rights protection. Article
6bis of the Convention necessitates that the rights of paternity and integrity be guaranteed
to copyright holders. Broadly, this means that an artist, author, or other creator of a
work, “shall have the right to claim authorship of the work.”13 The right of integrity
provides that the author or artist has the right “to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”14
There are two primary perspectives about the “purpose of intellectual property
protection…[they are] economic and moral.”15 As shall be discussed below, the United
States has fallen much more on the side of economic than moral interests, despite its
eventual implementation of the Berne Convention in 1988,16 while France, a bastion of
author’s rights advocacy, falls on the moral side. In even broader terms of socio-cultural
11
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generalization, Western ideals are centered around the free market, individual rights and
the idea that profits are the appropriate reward for creative endeavors, while other
systems are more interested in the welfare of the community and equal distribution of
wealth.17 Wide discrepancies in points of view about this aspect of copyright law explain
the movement to harmonize copyright law on an international scale. Harmonization
through reduction of national legal disparities would ostensibly reduce the cost, time and
incertitude involved in determining rights, thereby reducing obstacles to innovation and
global trade.18
Short of harmonization, these discrepancies demonstrate an acute need to
implement a clear structure whereby States with different views about moral rights can
trust that their interests in protecting the intellectual property rights of their nationals are
being satisfied. Indeed, harmonization may be both impractical and undesirable. An
emphasis on harmonization may actually prevent individual countries from pursuing their
own domestic policy agendas.19 Furthermore, copyright law “goes to the heart of a
nation’s information and cultural policy because [it] influences the creation and
distribution of knowledge and culture…. [I]t is no surprise that nations would resist
giving up autonomy over their copyright policies.”20
II.

Choice of Law
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In the United States, “[c]hoice of law issues have largely been ignored in past
copyright decisions, with many courts apparently assuming without analysis that U.S. law
applies to determine ownership and infringement for foreign nationals.”21 Insofar as
choice of law is an issue, Berne Union States must agree that the national law of
infringement will be applied uniformly to foreign and domestic authors and artists, as
described above. Both procedural and substantive differences in copyright laws may
make choice of laws questions determinative of the outcome in a given case. For
example, as a default rule, copyright for Berne Union members lasts for 50 years after the
death of the author or artist,22 but individual countries have an option to provide longer
protection. In European Community countries, artists rights societies and pay-per-view
lobbies have succeeded in raising this duration to 70 years after the artist’s death.23 The
determination of the length of a work’s copyright protection is a different number of
years in different countries, illustrating how choice of law is of paramount importance.
Choice of law in copyright disputes is, at best, “a work in progress.”24 Any given
copyright case will involve a number of factors that determine whose law should be
applied, including meanings of originality and ownership, and conceptual questions such
as the scope of applicable subject matter. While an in-depth discussion of choice of law
issues is beyond the scope of this writing, it is essential to note that it is an extremely
important but unclear area of law whose boundaries and parameters have not yet been
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defined by the courts.25 The advent and growing use of the world wide web as a platform
on which to view, copy and disseminate works of intellectual property exacerbate the
issue and has caused much discussion and legislation,26 but the interpretation of these
new treaties remains inconsistent. The Internet, in this context, is an unprecedented
challenge; its “global dimensions, which cut across territorial borders, are creating
significant legal questions…[it] is a legal and jurisdictional ‘no-man’s land.’”27
Two treaties promulgated by the World Intellectual Property Organization
[hereinafter WIPO] clarify that existing rights continue to apply in the digital
environment. They also create new online rights. “To maintain a fair balance of interests
between the owners of rights and the general public, the treaties further clarify that
countries have reasonable flexibility in establishing exceptions or limitations to rights in
the digital environment.”28 Like the Berne Convention, then, these two “Internet
treaties”29 do not mandate harmonization. The application of the laws of one country’s
system over another will, in most cases, lead to different results.30 One solution may be
to select, based on certain criteria, from among the various potentially applicable
systems, the laws of one system to govern the legal relationship. “This, in essence, is the
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exercise of determining the applicable law under a private international law approach.”31
Whether and how the Internet treaties will function in an international context insofar as
choice of law has yet to be seen, because they bow to individual nations’ implementing
legislation. “This means that even if the international norm-makers got the balance
right…, there remains ample opportunity for national legislators to get it ‘wrong’…”32
In response to the existing nebulous choice of law schemes, and to attempt to deal
with jurisdictional matters of international intellectual property matters, Professors
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg have been working on a draft convention adapted
from the test of the Draft Hague Convention. In January 2001, the professors presented
WIPO delegates with a Draft Convention On Jurisdiction And Recognition Of Judgments
In Intellectual Property Matters [hereinafter Draft Convention], providing suggestions for
dealing with the regulation of online content.33 The Draft Convention was intended to
cover a gamut of intellectual property matters such as copyrights, neighboring rights,
trademarks, and unfair competition, and was meant to cover disputes regarding violations
occurring not only on the Internet but also in the off-line world.34
A report was drafted in March of 2004 to summarize the progress of the Draft
Convention. The objective of the Convention, upon its completion, is “to make exclusive
choice of court agreements as effective as possible in the context of international
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business.”35 The present form of the Draft Convention is a bit different from the original
that Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg drew up in the late 90’s, however. This is
because, as work proceeded on drafting, it became apparent that it would not be possible
to draw up a satisfactory text for a convention that deals with so many different
jurisdictional models within a reasonable period of time. “The reasons for this included
the wide differences in the existing rules of jurisdiction in different States and the
unforeseeable effects of technological developments, including the Internet, on the
jurisdictional rules that might be laid down in the Convention.”36 Sections 29 and 30 of
the revised Draft Convention deal specifically but cursorily with intellectual property and
the Draft has yet to be passed.
A.

Choice of Law Difficulties: Rights of Privacy and Rights of Publicity
Having briefly examined the landscape of international copyright law, I will

discuss an issue that demonstrates the variances in national copyright tenets which,
arguably, would be difficult if not insurmountable differences in drafting a potential
international law. The very philosophical foundations of some intellectual property laws
are so different as to be diametrically opposed in some instances. For example, if
someone takes a clear photograph of a couple strolling in a park and posts it to her
weblog as one of several places she visited in town during vacation, the ramifications
may be far different in the United States than in a European country. United States law
generally fails to be roused unless the photographer is making a profit on the image, so
the weblogger is likely safe in posting that photograph.
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A European law, however, may be interpreted so as to be just as interested in
protecting the privacy of the subject of the photograph as in protecting the monetary
interest the subject has in his or her image. Under a European law, therefore, the
weblogger may be violating personality rights of the couple simply by dint of the fact that
their faces are recognizable. In a 1988 case heard by the Dutch Supreme Court, the
magazine publication of a photograph of a couple walking in Amsterdam’s Vondelpark
was found to infringe on the couple’s right of privacy; unbeknownst to the photographer,
the couple were having an affair and sued the magazine for having publicized that fact.37
i.

The United States
In the United States, privacy law governs a host of issues ranging from public

disclosure of private facts to intrusion upon seclusion to “false light,” which is a tort that
creates a cause of action when one publicly discloses a matter that places a person in a
false light that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”38 The right of publicity falls
into a subgroup of privacy issues called appropriation. “One who appropriates to his own
use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.”39 The right of publicity was first recognized in a 1953 Second
Circuit case, wherein the judge held that “many prominent persons (especially actors and
ball- players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
buses, trains and subways.”40
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Economic interests seem to drive the U.S. law that protects the appropriation of
one’s likeness, at least when that person’s likeness could potentially engender a profit for
the appropriating party. Other aspects of privacy law are aimed at protecting a person’s
sense of self, but these laws are often not codified and the outcomes of case law are
inconsistent.41 In his seminal work on the rights of publicity and privacy, J. Thomas
McCarthy stated succinctly that “while the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is
invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the
pocketbook.”42
ii.

European Civil Law Traditions
In contrast with common law jurisdictions, most civil law jurisdictions have

specific codified provisions that protect an individual's image, personal data and other
generally private information. Exceptions have often been carved out of these general,
broad privacy rights when dealing with news and public figures. Moreover, personality
rights, somewhat akin to United States’ general privacy rights, are generally inheritable in
European civil law jurisdictions.
In France, personality rights are protected under Article 9 of the French Civil
Code. In essence, the article provides that all persons have a right to a private life and
that a judge has discretion to ensure that privilege.43 While publicly known facts and
images of public figures are not generally protected, use of someone's image or personal
history has been held actionable under French law. In 2000, for example, it was held that
placing a person’s photograph on the Internet without that person’s acquiescence is a
41
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violation of that person’s personality rights.44 In Germany, Article 2, Section 1 of the
German Basic Law provides that “every person shall have the right to free development
of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others….”45 The German
personality right is closely associated with human dignity and an idea that borders on a
right to respect.46
As suggested above with the example of the couple walking in the Vondelpark,
not only do these different models of law rest in different philosophical foundations, they
also have the inherent capacity of producing opposite outcomes. This dichotomy is
further exemplified in an analysis of moral rights doctrine.
III.

Moral Rights
The above discussion of personality rights and rights of publicity are a tangent as

well as an introduction to the broader doctrine of moral rights. Moral rights encompass
various strains of the protection discussed above, namely, personal interest in the creation
of one’s authorship. For example: a photograph may include both the personality interest
of the subject of the photograph and the moral rights interests of the photographer
himself. For a painting, the equation is usually simplified to the interests of the painter,
although there have been cases that brought into question the rights of the painter’s
subject and commissioner.47 The principal rationalization for the protection of moral
propres à empêcher ou faire cesser une atteinte à l'intimité de la vie privée : ces mesures peuvent, s'il y a
urgence, être ordonnées en référé.” Id.
44
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rights is the idea that the work of art “is an extension of the artist’s personality, an
expression of his innermost being. To mistreat the work of art is to mistreat the artist, to
invade his area of privacy, to impair his personality.”48
In modern history, this idea of protecting the extension of oneself can be traced
back to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, among others. Kant believed that an
author’s vision can be encompassed by an action, which is an exertion of the author’s
will, not an external, other thing.49 Indeed, an author can “find Ideas for a given concept,
and moreover…express those Ideas in such a way that the subjective state of mind
accompanying the concept can be communicated to others.”50
In an 1841 note addressed to the Members of a Parliamentary Committee
responsible for examining the revision of the law on literary property, French author
Honoré de Balzac asked the question: ‘who on earth can prevent the recognition of the
only property that human beings create without earth or stone, and which is as durable as
earth and stone?’”51 Balzac and fellow writer Victor Hugo founded la Société des gens
de lettres (The Society of French Writers) in 1837, which was expanded and replaced in
1851 by the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique [hereinafter
SACEM].52 This was the first collective administration or copyright collecting society
for creators and publishers. SACEM’s function and importance will be discussed more
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below, but it is interesting to note here that struggles in copyright law insofar as
compensation to authors, artists and their distributors do not constitute a new friction;
they are inherent in the law’s lack of specific remuneration plan. European countries
have dealt differently with the concept of moral rights, but the differences amongst them
are small compared to the dissimilar moral rights underpinnings of United States law,
which has only very recently recognized their existence. The divergent philosophical
bases for these models can arguably be gleaned from their respective definitions of moral
rights.
A.

The United States
Moral rights are defined in the United States as rights “protecting a visual artist’s

work beyond the ordinary protections of copyright.”53 The United States’ Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990, discussed below, defines moral rights as including “both integrity
rights, which protect the work from changes that damage the artist’s or the work’s
reputation, and attribution rights, which allow the artist to claim authorship of the work
and to prevent the unlawful use of the author’s name in reference to a modified version of
the work.”54 The Berne Convention’s definition of moral rights includes more breadth
and specificity:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation. The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed…55
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As was discussed above, the Berne Convention allows rather broad margins for
compliance with its Articles. Article 6bis, in fact, includes language that exempts
individual States from mandating that a post-mortem right remain in an author’s rights,56
an exemption the United States has taken advantage of by limiting author’s rights to his
or her lifetime.57 Indeed, the Berne Convention’s broad margins are arguably so wide as
to not filter out any deviance in national law whatsoever. As one author puts it: “To truly
comply with the Berne Convention, it may be necessary for U.S. law to depart from its
utilitarian, market-driven tradition, and to affirmatively provide protection to authors in a
manner consistent with that provided by other member countries of the Berne
Convention.”58
Copyright protection in the United States stems from the Constitution59 wherein
the goal is the promotion of the progress of “Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”60 The very purpose of intellectual property protection, then, is related
to the benefit of the community as a whole by means of offering compensation to those
whose work advances this progress. The purpose is not to reward the authors, but rather
they are rewarded as a means to the end goal of promoting public progress. When the
United States implemented the Berne Convention in 1989,61 over 100 years after the
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Convention’s inception, the consensus of the consultants was that the United States
should and could adhere to it without making major changes in United States law.62 The
United States had long resisted joining the Berne Union for multiple reasons, chief
among which was its aversion to moral rights laws.63
A classic example of United States law prior to its official – albeit arguably
inadequate -- adhesion to Berne’s moral rights principles is the 1948 New York
Shostakovich case64 in which the plaintiffs, musical composers of international renown
from the Soviet Union, sued a United States film company. The composers sued for the
erratic and out-of-context use of their music compositions in one of the company’s films,
despite the credit they were given in connection with the abridged music. The court
stated that there were not any well-founded reasons to believe that the film company
distorted the compositions nor reason to believe that the compositions had not been
faithfully reproduced. In trying to come to terms with the concept of moral rights, the
court asked: “Is the standard to be good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral
concepts or what is it to be? In the present state of our law the very existence of the right
is not clear, the relative position of the rights thereunder with reference to the rights of
others is not defined nor has the nature of the proper remedy been determined.”65 The
court therefore held that, in the absence of any clear showing of the infliction of a willful
injury or of any invasion of a moral right, it should not consider granting the plaintiff’s
requested injunctive relief.
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i.

The Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention
Implementation Act

Under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural
Organization [hereinafter UNESCO], the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952
[hereinafter the UCC] was concluded with the key objective of rapidly bringing the
United States into multilateral copyright arrangements.66 The UCC was drafted so as to
require as few changes in United States domestic law as necessary for the United States
to sign on. The UCC was therefore something of a watered-down version of the Berne
Convention and, because several States are signatories to both, Article XVII and the
Appendix Declaration of the UCC establish that among states party to both, the terms of
the Berne Convention govern. While the United States’ eventual Berne Convention
Implementation Act [hereinafter BCIA] was far from perfectly mapped onto Article 6bis
of the Convention, the United States’ former approach to moral rights was not
immediately construed as per se inadequate. The Director General of WIPO at that time
stated that, in his view, “it is not necessary for the United States…to enact statutory
provisions on moral rights in order to comply with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.
The requirements under this Article can be fulfilled not only by statutory provisions in a
copyright statute but also by common law and other statutes…”67 Whether the United
States’ treatment of moral rights was truly seen as adequate is debated; it is possible that
various parties were so interested in the United States’ adhesion to the Convention as to
disregard the moral rights discrepancy for the immediate future.68
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ii.

The Visual Artists Rights Act

According to some, the United States’ adherence to the Berne Convention did not
necessarily reflect a desire to embrace moral rights, “but rather to combat copyright
piracy.”69 In spite of the leniency with which the United States was allowed into the
Berne Union, an act was implemented two years after the BCIA to codify certain aspects
of moral rights for works of visual arts; this was the Visual Artists Rights Act70
[hereinafter VARA].
VARA went into effect on June 1, 1991. It grants artists a continuing right to
restrict the use and disposition of artistic works that they have sold to private citizens and
codifies “the doctrine that artists retain inherent moral rights in their creations even after
those works have been sold.”71 This provision shifts certain property rights from the
person who possesses the work of art back to the person who created it, an unprecedented
property law alteration in United States law. VARA was drawn up and implemented
because
[a]n artist’s professional and personal identity is embodied in each work created
by that artist. Each work is a part of his or her reputation. Each work is a form of
personal expression (oftentimes painstakingly and earnestly recorded). It is a
rebuke to the dignity of the visual artist that our copyright law allows distortion,
modification and even outright permanent destruction of such efforts.72

(copyright "adaptation" rights, federal protection against "false designations," and common law doctrines of
unfair competition, privacy, and defamation) is in full and sufficient compliance with moral rights (and
other) provisions of the Convention, that Congress does not intend any part of the Berne Convention to be
"self-executing," and that adherence neither expands nor reduces any such existing federal or state statutory
or common law analogue of the rights of paternity (a creator's right to be credited as author of his or her
work) or integrity (protection against harmful distortion or mutilation). Although the new Congress is
expected to consider certain moral rights-related issues, and individual plaintiffs may seek relief under
current doctrine, the BCIA was structured to assure that these questions are addressed on their own merits,
free of claims to Berne obligations and precedents.” Id.
69
Merryman and Elsen, supra note 47, at 356.
70
The Visual Artists Rights Act, supra note 54.
71
George C. Smith, Chief minority counsel for the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the
Law, Jan. 1991. See Merryman and Elsen, supra note 47, at 359.
72
H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990).

18

Three specific rights are granted to visual artists under VARA. They are the right of
attribution, the right of integrity and, in the case of works of visual art of “recognized
stature,” the right to prevent destruction.73 Although moral rights were not recognized in
the United States prior to the enactment of VARA, some state legislatures had enacted
moral rights laws, and a few judicial decisions accorded some moral rights protection
under various theories of copyright, defamation, invasion of privacy, unfair competition
and breach of contract.74 This last theory is perhaps especially important in U.S. law
because parties’ freedom to contract to whatever terms they like is a highly prized
privilege. Where VARA differs significantly from its counterpart European laws is in the
alienability of moral rights. Under VARA, there is a provision for the waiver of moral
rights through a signed, written agreement specifying the work and the precise uses to
which the waiver applies.
Congress determined that an artist’s rights “should not be absolute, but that they
should be tempered by commercial realities, provided that provisions were enacted to
insulate authors from being unduly influenced to give away their new-found rights.”75
According to some, VARA’s problem lies in its restrictiveness: it grants protection only
to those artists whose works are included within VARA’s narrow definition of ‘works of
visual art.’76 But ‘real’ moral rights do much more than just safeguard the alteration of
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the original physical object; ‘real’ moral rights also guard against distortion of
representations of the art image.77
B.

France
French law epitomizes the other end of the moral rights spectrum in terms of

ideology. “Moral rights arise from the French concept that a creative work contains the
personality of its creator or author. Copyright is a property right, while the author's moral
right is an extension of the author's character and personality. Personality is not
transferable,”78 which is why moral rights are perpetual, inalienable, and descend to the
heirs of the author, even after the author transfers the economic rights to another person
or company.79 Indeed, Art. L 111-1 of the French Code of Intellectual Property provides
that the author of a work enjoys a property right in that work by dint of the fact that it
came from his or her soul, and that the right in that work is exclusively built-in to the
creator’s being.80 Professor Pamela Samuelson, an intellectual property law specialist
and scholar currently at the University of California at Berkeley, thinks that “the rights of
the author to control the integrity of the work are considered by several European
countries to be the key rights, and the economic rights are secondary.”81
In addition to the Berne Convention’s stipulations for the rights to integrity and
attribution, French law provides for the right of disclosure, the right to withdraw or
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retract and the right to reply to criticism.82 The right of disclosure83 prevents a publisher
from modifying an author’s work, except with the author’s written permission. The right
to withdraw or retract allows an author whose views have changed or who is unhappy
with his or her work to purchase any remaining copies of that work at wholesale price
and prevent future printing.84 The right to reply to criticism gives an author the right to
reply to a critic and to have that reply published in the same forum as the critique, thereby
promoting discussion and debate. The same plaintiffs from the Soviet Union in the
Shostakovich case,85 supra, sued under the same premise in France; not surprisingly,
perhaps, they won there.86
C.

Other Traditions
Between the United States’ relative disregard for moral rights and France’s great

emphasis thereon, there are of course other schemas that hover somewhere in between.
One such example is Russia. Russia’s Copyright and Adjacent Rights Act confers on an
author the rights of use of his or her work taking into account legally adapted rights and
interests of third persons. “He may also prohibit third persons [from using] his work
without his…permission. It is obvious that [the] author may apply both existing modes
of use of his work and those which will come in [the] future. With some kind of reserve
we may say that the totality of copyrights is divided into two parts: personal property
rights and moral rights.”87 Specifically, a Russian author is granted an inalienable right
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of recognition as the creator of the product, a right to the work’s integrity, a right to use
the work under the author's name or a fictitious name, and a right to make the work
public.88 While Russia’s main concern during its transitional years from communism
may be to dampen ubiquitous pirating of intellectual property,89 their laws reflect some of
the ideological underpinnings of European models.
In Denmark, moral rights laws are in place but the perpetuity of the right is
questionable. According to a Danish report in the 1990s, the perpetuity of the moral right
of integrity was not necessarily a good idea. “’…European law would perhaps be better
off if the Moral rights always ran out with copyright…modern society obviously cannot
be forced by law to respect the integrity of works only because they are called works of
art….’”90 In contrast, Spain expressly provides for the perpetuity of moral rights.91 The
Netherlands “decidedly does not belong to the group of countries which recognize an
eternal moral right, with the State acting as a watchdog over the integrity of works, as
well as with all the ensuing dangers for freedom of expression and information.”92
Clearly, there is no consistent adherence to any one moral rights scheme, even throughout
Europe, and despite the Berne Convention’s emphasis on moral rights as the primary
justification for copyright law.93
IV.

Digitization and Digital Rights Management
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“The Internet holds out the promise of broad electronic boulevards down which
the creative output of our age will travel effortlessly.”94 This writing focuses on the
situation of visual art and imagery, as opposed to music and other audio content, as it
exists in tangible form and on the Internet. The most prevalent – and controversial –
system by which intellectual property owners are trying to protect their visual work
online is through digital rights management [hereinafter DRM]. “DRM covers the
description, identification, trading, protection, monitoring and tracking of all forms of
rights usages over both tangible and intangible assets including management of rights
holders’ relationships. Additionally, it is important to note that DRM is the ‘digital
management of rights’ and not the ‘management of digital rights,’”95 an important
distinction to remember since digitization does not necessarily require a new set of rules,
just the application of old rules to new technology. “The technologies for identifying and
labeling content have been present for several years. Watermarking, identifiers, and
fingerprinting are the names given to these technologies, which have multiple functions
and modes.”96
It is also important to note that the definition of DRM varies depending on its
context and the author; as a relatively new concept, it has yet to be immortalized in most
law dictionaries.97 DRM may describe a kind of rights validation to ensure that content
being created from existing content includes the rights to do so, or it might describe the
93

Craig Joyce, et. al., COPYRIGHT LAW 37 (5th ed. 2001).
Ralph Oman, From Scourge to Savior: How Digital Technology Will Save Authorship in the Age of the
Internet. WIPO International Forum on the Exercise and Management of Copyright and Neighboring
Rights in the Face of the Challenges of Digital Technology, Sevilla, Spain, 1997, at 209. (WIPO Pub. No.
756 (E), 1998).
95
Renato Iannella, Digital Rights Management Architectures , D-LIB MAGAZINE, June 2001, available at
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/june01/iannella/06iannella.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
96
Severine Dusollier, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Information and Moral Rights, 25
COLUM J.L. & ARTS 377 (2003).
94

23

management of permissions to enable the usage environment to honor the rights
associated with the content. For example, if a user only has the right to view the
document, then DRM technology could prevent that document from being printed. DRM
may mean a whole host of other things as well, such as digital signatures and encryption,
which are interesting but tangential issues to this writing.98
For copyright owners, digital networks represent both a great opportunity and a
great threat.99 The traditional copyright system has endeavored to maintain “balance
between protecting creators’ property rights and the exclusive right to control use of
copies of their work, and the public good in fair access to and use of such materials.”100
That balance is now more precarious because of digital technologies and the manner in
which they have changed how people access and utilize information.101
The digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners,
and as such, necessitates protection against devices that undermine copyright
interests. In contrast to the analog experience, digital technology enables pirates
to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of works – at virtually no cost at all to
the pirate. As technology advances, so must our laws.102
“The key difference between digital and analog identifiers lies in the ease of
embedding any digital information in digital content. The information can be
permanently, invisibly and indelibly attached to a digital copy.”103

A.

Watermarking
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Watermarking is often cited when discussing copyright protection technologies.
A watermark is information embedded on an image that is often, but not always,
imperceptible.104 Generally, digital watermarking serves two primary uses: first, to
control use of the work by placing instructions in the watermark that limit the uses a
device may make of the work; second, to identify copyrighted works by providing
identifying information in the watermarks.105 The embedded information can be
extracted by special software. For example, the first type of watermark, a ‘watermarking
detector,’ can, when applied to content that is suspected to have been pirated, check if the
content bears the watermark and thereby prove or disprove the suspicion.106 The second
type of watermark, a ‘transaction watermark’ allows the establishment of a link between
an arbitrary user with the content he or she ‘touched.’107 This practice, also called
‘fingerprinting,’ is widely used “by photo agencies, who place their name or logo on a
copy of a photo for promotional purposes, and then deliver the picture without the
marking once payment has been made.”108
B.

Corbis Corporation and DRM
Corbis Corporation, created by Bill Gates in the early 1990s, provides services for

licensing images in advertising, books, newspapers, magazines, on TV, on the Internet
and in films.109 It offers solutions that enable publishers, advertising and design agencies
104
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to enhance their products with photography, fine art, illustrations and footage by
managing the intellectual property rights of the copyright holders of these various forms
of visual content. “In a world where the arrival of digital technology has brought serious
challenges to copyright protection of music and film, Corbis is that rare thing: a business
that believes copyright protection and commercial use of the Internet can peaceably
coexist.…”110 Steve Davis, an attorney and the chief executive officer of Corbis, notes
that “in today’s online market, you can’t be in business without spending an enormous
amount of time thinking about how to protect intellectual property: how to restrict access
to it, how to exploit and market it.”111 For a large percentage of its content, which is
created expressly for licensing through its website, Corbis buys images on a contract
basis and licenses them to organizations or individuals; photographers retain the
copyright in their work.112
i.

Fine Art at Corbis

A portion of Corbis’s website hosts an array of fine art. “From masterpieces of
world art to the obscurities of well-known artists, the Corbis collection brings together
the most comprehensive selection of art images in the world.”113 The first licensing deal
Corbis made was with a collection of classical paintings called Archivo Iconografico; in
fact, Mr. Gates initially targeted museums and art galleries based on his belief that there
would soon be a market for digital images of cultural objects.114 Mr. Davis recalls that,
in 1993, “there was no way that people could handle or pay for digital media from their
110
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desktops…. I remember a conference in Cannes when Phillipe de Montebello, director of
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, said: ‘I will never, never, never, have a
digital machine in my museum.’”115 Now kiosks and interactive displays are
commonplace.
Because of countries’ different copyright laws and the range of contractual
relationships between rights managers and rights holders, any given “rights-managed”
image offered by Corbis will include a unique menu of restrictions. A digitized
photograph by Brett Weston, a contemporary photographer, for example, includes
restrictions such as “Not available for use in clip art or clip photography product; Not
available for fine art print use (limited editions of art value); and Image may not be
cropped under any circumstances.”116 Corbis’s image of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa,
on the other hand, stipulates that the image is “Not available for display as artwork on
plasma screens, LCD screens or other electronic televisions or monitors; and not for use
by or for manufacturers or sellers of digital art products or digital display products.”117
Perhaps the rational here is that the plasma screen would too closely replicate the original
artwork, although, in terms of other reproductive media, poster replications of the Mona
Lisa are widely available, begging the question whether the ban on digitization will
endure.
C.

Moral Rights and Digitization
Inherent in this discussion of new technologies and the ability to view, use, and

disseminate cultural images in digital formats is the fact that these images are
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transformed from one media to another when they are digitized and essentially changed.
Whether a digital image’s very existence is acceptable when discussed in the context of
moral rights is often skipped over when the analysis involves when and how a digital
image may be used. Copyright owners of priceless works of art who have traditionally
been generous in allowing museums to produce glossy catalogues that include an image
of their paintings have been hesitant to allow museums to upload those same images to a
website.118
The digitization of works on media such as CD-ROMs or computer memories and
transmission of these works over telecommunications networks are
revolutionizing the exploitation of creative products. This explains the current
trend to transfer protection to producers, a development that has definitely
gathered speed with the new creative techniques and is tending to distort the
function of the droit d'auteur as the eighteenth-century philosophers conceived it-a natural property at the service of the creative mind.119
Any image incorporated into a multimedia platform must, by definition, be
digitized. “The downside to digitization is that the content is reduced to a source code
comprising a configuration of 1s and 0s. In this state, the information may be easily
manipulated, making it very simple for either the developer or the end user to alter the
original work.”120 In addition to the ease with which an unprotected image may be
altered, the digitization scenario begs the question whether the artist is or should be at
ease with the transformation of his work into “1s and 0s.” Other aspects of an image will
likely be altered during digitization. Its size and most likely its color tones will be
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altered. This could ostensibly amount to derogatory treatment, although,even on an
international scale, “[t]here is a dearth of case law in this area.”121
Perhaps, though, there are new moral rights being inadvertently granted by dint of
digitization: “[C]opyright law grants a new right of authentication, a digital counterpart
of the moral right, or a right of attribution, akin to the continental moral right, in
countries, such as the United States, where such a right did not heretofore exist.”122
Professor Ginsburg made the point that the DMCA “may contain the seeds of a more
general attribution right: with sufficient ingenuity and effort, these seeds might be made
to germinate…. Inclusion of the author’s name in protected copyright management
information suggest that the copyright law finally affords authors of all works…a right to
recognition of their authorial status.”123 The right of attribution, discussed above, entitles
an author to claim authorship in his or her work. In the digital sphere, the technological
link between the digital document and the author’s name could provide that right without
accompanying legislation. Ensuring that it is the author’s name to which an image links
instead of the identity of the producer, however, could be a challenge.124
The upside to the above predicament is that, although “new forms of
communication are a threat to the exclusive copyrights…[they are] also a big possibility
for gaining more markets, which could become a key to much more compensation.”125
The compensation issue begs the question: who is being compensated. If it is the artist
himself, then his consent to digitization is one set of issues; if it is an artist’s agent, heir
121
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or benefactor, that is another. The issue has not been addressed consistently under the
auspices of moral rights or author’s rights. While nations like France deem these rights
to be inalienble so that no agent could pressure an artist to give them up, the potential
benefits of digitization understandably prevent a “right against digitization” from
becoming part of a moral rights code. That being said, the potential harm of digitization
in terms of a work’s integrity and susceptibility to piracy has not been directly addressed,
but there are many interested parties who are “alarmed about the potential for fraud and
artistic counterfeit in the wildwest world of digital commerce.”126 Copyright law should
ensure that authors, and not producers or distributors, have the same type of control with
DRM that they enjoy with tangible works.127
D.

Museums and DRM Options
Museums preserve cultural integrity and diversity and fulfil their mission of

exhibiting their collections to national and international audiences.128 Whether part of
that mission includes the usage of digital technology to disseminate information and
imagery over the Internet is uncertain. Many museums whose collections include
manuscripts, photographs, paintings, sculpture and cultural artifacts have digitized
images of these works and displayed them on the Internet. While digitization can be
expensive and technically complex,129 it also holds the possibility of promoting economic
development, academic research and education. Furthermore, it could enable museums
to manage and exploit their collections and to make their cultural riches available to any
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person in the general community with access to a computer network, a result that is
probably very compatible with the mission statement of most museums.
While many very laudable goals may be reached by digitizing collections, there
are intellectual property concerns about the process that have not been fully addressed.
“These concerns have sometimes paralyzed those who would otherwise enthusiastically
embrace the new technologies…with many museums, rights administration procedures
are currently based on a physical, print model of publication and distribution, and do not
envisage the possibility of digital images of the works.”130 Digitizing a collection
ostensibly allows a museum to reach a wider clientele, to obtain assistance in managing
rights and reproduction, to gain national or international promotion and marketing
services, and to thereby increase revenue.131 Possible disadvantages include the loss of
control in various important capacities, such as the selection of licensed content, the
quantity and quality of the image, and pricing decisions.132 “The cultural embodiments
of learning and entertainment are already spinning inexorably across the Internet which
knows no national boundaries.”133
Museum digitization projects clearly raise policy, technical and financial issues
that should be addressed before museum images are displayed in a digital environment.134
Cultural heritage institutions are developing new projects for online licensing of their
collections. The Art Museum Image Consortium [hereinafter AMICO], a not-for-profit
organization of institutions with collections of art, collaborates to enable educational use
130
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of museum multimedia.135 It provides a database documenting over 100,000 digitized
artworks from several North American museums, “highlighting the creative output of
cultures around the world, from prehistoric to contemporary times, and covering the
complete range of expressive forms. Cultures and time periods represented range from
contemporary art, Native American and Inuit art, to ancient Greek, Roman, and Egyptian
works, along with Japanese and Chinese works.”136
Another model of a digital museum collection is Russia’s Hermitage Museum.
With the collaboration of IBM Corp., The Hermitage has a fully-searchable online
catalog of its collection. A visitor to the website can search or browse the entire
collection; once an image is located, the viewer can select from a menu of screen
resolutions and angles at which the painting or artwork was photographed. The usage
policy, to which the website viewer must navigate on his own, is succinct:
The contents of this site, including all images and text, are for personal,
educational, non-commercial use only. The contents of this site may not be
reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form without the written permission of the
State Hermitage Museum. Images on this web site have been invisibly
watermarked; any attempt to remove the watermarks from these images is
expressly forbidden.137

The AMICO model uses the preemptive form of digital rights management,
wherein it allows access to the images only through a specific contract agreement with an
educational entity or institution. The Hermitage model allows access to anyone who has
access to the Internet. Like the Corbis website, the Hermitage Library transfers the onus
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of copyright infringement responsibility to the end user. For example, it does not
technologically prevent someone from right-clicking on an image and saving it to her
hard drive or using it as wallpaper, which would probably be an acceptable usage of the
image, but it has the technological capacity to find out that kind of information and
thereby bring suit against any entity that uses its images in a fashion inconsistent with its
terms.
Another model is demonstrated by an older system used by the Getty Museum for
its website.138 In 2002, the Museum implemented a copyright scheme whereby all
images on the J. Paul Getty Museum website larger than a thumbnail contained a
watermark stating who owns the image; a click would bring the user to the Getty
copyright clause.139 “We protect what we need to protect;” other than that, “we
encourage you to rip, mix and burn. After all, it's your cultural heritage.”140 The Getty’s
website currently operates similarly to that of the Hermitage.
E.

Non-Museum Art and DRM
Another possibility in licensing digital content is to go through a collective rights

organization. For example, the Media Image Resource Alliance [hereinafter MIRA],
based in New Jersey, is a joint project of the Copyright Clearance Center and the
Association of Media Photographers. The VERDI project [Very Extensive Rights Data
Information Project] is a European multimedia information and licensing network
between nationally-managed clearance services designed to facilitate rights trading. By
linking together these existing rights clearance centers, “VERDI will create a simple and
138
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cost-effective Internet-based service for multimedia rights clearance. VERDI will provide
the producer the services and information he needs for obtaining the right to use preexisting content in his multimedia production.”141
F.

Collecting Societies
Collecting societies are private societies established by authors and proprietors of

neighboring rights with the objective of protecting their rights collectively in areas of use
where individual collection is not possible. Most collecting societies perform four basic
functions. They license works in which they hold the copyright or for which they act as
agent on behalf of their members for specific uses; they monitor use and collect revenues;
they distribute revenues as royalties to members; and they enter into reciprocal
arrangements with foreign collecting societies to collect and distribute local royalties to
foreign rightsholders and to receive and distribute royalties earned overseas to local
rightsholders.142
In the majority of contexts in which it is defined and discussed, collecting
societies are more important to the music industry than to that of visual arts. As
mentioned above, the first collecting society, SACEM, was formed in France in the mid1800s. It served as a model for other societies such as the UK Performing Rights Society
(PRS), German Gesellschaft fur Musikalische Auffuhrungs (GEMA) and Australia's
Australian Performing Right Association (APRA).143 The American Society of
Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP) was established in 1914 and has flourished.
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Despite the number of collecting societies, “there is no single collective rights
management body covering all countries or all of the web. As with most commercial and
intellectual property law there is instead a patchwork: resplendent in places, threadbare or
moth-eaten in others.”144 Reciprocity is encouraged by the Confederation Internationale
des Societes Auteurs & Compositeurs [hereinafter CISAC], the International Federation
of Reproduction Rights Organizations, the Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les
Droits D'Enregistrement et les Reproduction Mecanique and other bodies. CISAC has
been active in encouraging international standards for the identification of copyright
works, exchange of rights information between databases and the development of
electronic copyright management and digital rights management systems.
Founded in 1926, CISAC is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. Its
headquarters are established in Paris, with regional offices in Buenos Aires and
Singapore.145 CISAC works towards increased recognition and protection of creator's
rights. As of January 2004, it represents 209 authors' societies in 109 countries. CISAC
indirectly represents more than 2 million creators, covering all the artistic repertoires:
music, drama, literature, audio-visual works, graphic and visual arts, although income
from music currently represents well over 90% of all revenue. Most of the international
academic studies of the current state of collecting societies has focused on the music
sector, presumably because of the interaction of bundles of rights and uses and the size of
the market.146 Its activities are aimed at improving the position of authors and
composers, and at enhancing the quality of the collective administration of their rights
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throughout the world. With the growing importance of the Internet and its challenge to
the administration of authors' rights, CISAC reinforces its role as a service-driven
organization. Insofar as a conduit through which an artist’s moral rights might be
enforced, collecting societies seem to play a very limited role, even in France. There,
courts have been extremely hesitant to accept commencement of legal actions of persons
other than family members of an author or artist.147 In the United States, of course, moral
rights, if they exist at all, expire with the artist.
The Artists’ Rights Society [hereinafter ARS], an American company, is an
affiliate of CISAC. ARS is the “preeminent copyright, licensing, and monitoring
organization for visual artists in the United States. Founded in 1986, ARS represents the
intellectual property rights interests of over 30,000 visual artists (painters, sculptors,
photographers, architects and others) and estates of visual artists from around the
world.”148 The current struggle regarding collecting societies revolves around the advent
of the Internet and the new role of digital rights management in a realm the collecting
societies have overseen for so long. An international symposium is taking place in
Switzerland at the end of June of this year to address the very topic; its title is Digital
Rights Management: The End of Collecting Societies?. The objective of this symposium
is to take “a critical look at the challenging and equally important issues of content
distribution in the digital era. The focus is placed upon the controversial relationship
between DRM and Collecting Societies.”149

146

See Caslon, supra note 52.
See Dietz, supra note 90.
148
See Artists Rights Society, available at http://www.arsny.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
149
See The University of Lucerne Faculty of Law, The End of Collecting Societies, available at
http://www.unilu.ch/images/bilder_rf/Programme.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
147

36

G.

Photographs of Paintings and Digitization of Photographs of Paintings: The
Bridgeman Case and the Public Domain
As mentioned above in the discussion of the importance of moral rights for

imagery on the Internet, much of this discussion is based on the interest of the author in
his work, assuming that there is one. In many cases, however, when a work falls into the
public domain, or when there are no provisions for the continuity of a deceased artist’s
moral rights, there is no moral rights law with which an entity must tangle. While French
law passes some moral rights from the artist onto his or her heirs, many countries do not;
the artist’s moral rights interest in the work ends upon his or her death. For this reason,
some museums with older works do not need to grapple with the questions like whether
the painter of a 13th century icon painting would have been horrified at the digitization of
his work; he is not alive and possibly anonymous. The vast majority of museums,
however, do need to deal with it to some extent. The Louvre’s online image of Leonardo
da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, for example, includes a copyright line that reads: “R.M.N./H.
Lewandowski - Le Mage – Gattelet.”
The R.M.N. stands for la Réunion des Musées Nationaux, a French institution that
was founded in 1895 to raise and administer the funds required for the acquisition of
works of art by national collections.150 In the 1930s, it took over the publication of
postcards, guides and catalogues for the national museums’ permanent collections and the
temporary exhibitions organized by the R.M.N. This publishing activity — extended to
audiovisual publications, and, since 1993, to multimedia — has flourished in recent years
and the R.M.N.’s structure has changed accordingly. Today, the R.M.N. also
disseminates cultural material, striving to reconcile its mission as a public service with

37

market forces. The three names that follow the “R.M.N.” attached to the image of the
Mona Lisa are photographers who are members of the Photographic Agency of the
R.M.N.151 In this sense, the Louvre website operates much like that of Corbis. The
original artist is credited, of course, but the copyright in that image of the Mona Lisa is
ascribed to the R.M.N. and these photographers.
The reproduction of fine art in new media, such as digitized images on the
Internet, poses new problems for traditional rules. The United States was given some
controversial guidance on the principle in the 1999 case Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel
Corporation.152 The Bridgeman Art Library is a British company that acquires
photographs of works of art in the public domain and then licenses the use and
reproduction of these photographs.153 Corel is a Canadian corporation that sells computer
software products, one of which was a set of seven CD-ROMs containing seven hundred
photographic images of public domain paintings by European artists. Corel claimed to
have obtained the images from a source other than Bridgeman, but Bridgeman filed suit
against Corel for the 120 images that looked identical to those in the Bridgeman
collection, and for which Bridgeman claimed copyright. At issue was whether a
photograph of a two-dimensional painting is copyrightable, and the court ultimately
decided it is not.154
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While this decision’s ramifications may be quite broad, they will not necessarily
be injurious to the image houses that currently license the photographs. The two most
fertile corporations in this domain are Getty Images and Corbis. Getty Images recently
acquired the Bridgeman Library’s images and now offers them in digital format for
rights-managed licensing. While Getty Images may not be able to claim to own the
copyright in these images, as per the Bridgeman Art Library decision, it has the
advantage of having access to the Bridgeman photographs, which are of very high
quality. For an amateur to take a similar photograph would be difficult at best; to locate
the painting and gain permission to do so would likely be even more of a challenge. One
of the Bridgeman Art Library’s images was the Mona Lisa. A high-quality image of the
Mona Lisa is now available on Getty Image’s website for licensing. The text below the
image reads “The Bridgeman Art Library (rights-managed).”
V.

Amedeo Modigliani
At the beginning of this writing, I presented three possible venues at which to

view one of Amedeo Modigliani’s paintings of Jeanne Hébuterne. The first was the
website www.artnet.com, a “place to buy, sell and research fine art online.”155 Its Online
Gallery Network comprises images from over 1,300 galleries, 36,000 works and 13,000
artists from around the globe. “The Network serves dealers and art buyers alike by
providing a survey of the market and its pricing trends, as well as the means to
communicate instantly, inexpensively and globally.”156 While the images at artnet do not
have an attached copyright line and generally seem to be downloadable, there is a clear
Terms and Conditions policy on the website. Among its provisions, artnet claims:
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You may not modify, create derivative works from, participate in the transfer or
sale of, post on the World Wide Web, or in any way exploit the Site or any
portion thereof for any public or commercial use without the express written
permission of artnet.com. You may download one (1) copy of Content from the
Site for your personal use, provided that you maintain all copyright, attribution
and other notices contained in such Content, including without limitation
trademarks and service marks of artnet and its affiliates or the copyright holder
identified in the individual Content's copyright notice. You acknowledge that you
do not acquire any ownership rights by downloading copyrighted material. You
are responsible for complying with all applicable laws, rules and regulations
regarding your use of any such downloaded Content. In the event of any permitted
copying, redistribution or publication of material from the Site, no changes in or
deletion of author attribution, trademark, legend or copyright notice shall be
made.157

The next place I suggested to look at the digitized image of this Modigliani
painting was through the Gettyimages website. A Getty photographer, Odd Andersen,
photographed the painting being hung on a wall at Christie’s auction house on January
29, 2004. The caption to the image reads:
LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM: A Christie's auction house porter adjusts
Italian painter Amedeo Modigliani's “Portrait de Jeanne Hebuterne,” estimated
value 5-7 million pounds (7.3-10.2 million euros) in London, 29 January 2004.
The painting is part of Christie's 19th & 20th century art evening sales week,
expected to fetch a total of 75 million pounds (109.5 million euros)…Restrictions:
This image is only available in Getty Images offices in the United Kingdom,
United States, Germany (Austria, Switzerland via Germany), Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Australia.
In addition to these specific restrictions for this image, Gettyimages states in its
Terms and Conditions section that:

All elements of Getty Images websites, including, but not limited to, the general
design and the Content, are protected by trade dress, copyright, moral rights,
trademark and other laws relating to intellectual property rights. Except as
explicitly permitted under this or another agreement with Getty Images or one of
its subsidiaries or content providers, no portion or element of this website or its
Content may be copied or retransmitted via any means and this website, its
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Content and all related rights shall remain the exclusive property of Getty Images
or its third party content providers unless otherwise expressly agreed. Content
(including photographic images) purchased or otherwise acquired by you via the
Site may only be used by you for personal, non-commercial purposes (i.e., not for
re-sale or re-distribution) and may not be duplicated or otherwise reproduced or
altered by you.158
I also noted that, because the painting did not sell for the reserve price set by the
auction house, it was probably returned to the previous owner. Perhaps it is hanging in
his or her home. What would Amedeo Modigliani think of his paintings being digitized
and exhibited in these various fora? There is no text attached to the images that explains
who his subject is or why he painted her. He painted this particular piece in oil; would he
have condoned this work being uploaded onto the Internet at all? Is it a foregone
conclusion that web dissemination of an image of art is a benefit to society? A benefit to
the artist?
Amedeo Modigliani was born in Livorno, Italy, in July 1884. Both sides of his
family were Sephardic Jews. His father Flaminio was an unsuccessful entrepreneur who
had a small money-changing business, and his mother, Eugenia, ran an experimental
school.159 Modigliani moved to Paris in 1906, at the age of 22. He struggled for several
years with periods of poverty, bouts of depression, and difficult relationships. In July of
1917, he met Jeanne Hébuterne, who was then aged nineteen. The two lived together
between the French Riviera and Paris and had a child together the following year. Jeanne
became pregnant again in May of 1919. A few months later, Amedeo became very ill. In
mid-January of 1920, he was bedridden and comatose, suffering from tubercular
meningitis. He died on January 24, 1920, without regaining consciousness. There was an
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elaborate funeral, attended by the whole of the Montmartre neighborhood of Paris.
Jeanne, who had been taken to her parents’ house, threw herself out of a fifth floor
window two days after Modigliani's death, killing both herself and her unborn child.160
Amedeo and Jeanne’s surviving daughter, also named Jeanne, created the
“Archives Légales Amedeo Modigliani” [Legal Archives of Amedeo Modigliani] in
1983, a cultural association registered with the Paris Police Prefecture. The creation of
this organization, upon the decision of Jeanne Modigliani, aimed to classify and protect
the works of the artist. For 15 years, the association has been working along these lines,
faithful to its initial objective: to safeguard the worldwide spread of the knowledge of the
artist's works and the historical and esthetic information regarding them.161 The website
has an image archive of thumbnails for possible licensing. Modigliani’s estate is not
handled by the United States’ Artists Rights Society, as are many other famous artists;
however some of his works are available, inter alia, in the Bridgeman Art Library
collection, discussed above, as well as at various museum websites,162 and in printed
catalogues.163
The reason I believe this detailed promenade through the significance and
reinvention of Modigliani’s Portrait of Jeanne Hébuterne is important to this writing is
that it demonstrates the frenetic nature of current rights management systems with regard
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to copyright. Whether an artwork is in the public domain, whether the artist is alive, the
nationality of the artist, and the country in which an artwork is infringed upon in some
manner are only starting points to an analysis of the correct application of law. To truly
harmonize copyright protection for visual imagery would take more than a looselyworded international treaty since deep-rooted cultural and moral tenets regarding the
value of a creative work come into play and those values vary dramatically, even
amongst parties to the Berne Convention.
Before digital rights management systems become more sophisticated, I would
hope that WIPO and other international organizations that are involved in the regulation
of the Internet consider that there is no fast way to streamline copyright protection for
images on the Internet. The blessing and curse of the Internet is its ubiquity. The
blessing and curse of advanced technology is the ease with which imagery can be
transformed and manipulated. The challenge inherent in this situation arises from a
single worldwide platform on which to view digital imagery but a gamut of different
ideologies as to how and whether those images should be available. Who, then, should
make the ultimate decisions? “The parameters of the debate regarding copyright law
have historically been shaped, and continue to be shaped, by legislators and lobbyists,
with little involvement by others. This trend persists in the debate regarding copyright in
cyberspace.”164

This, among many other issues, highlights that those who have an

interest in the integrity and distribution of their creative works are not often the same
people who have authority or power of persuasion insofar as the law regarding this issue
is concerned.
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Technology continues to reinvent itself. Bill Gates, Corbis’s owner, has
approximately 30 flat-screen monitors in his Medina home to show digital pictures.
Gates and his wife Melinda “generally shuffle the images displayed on these monitors
every week. Nearly always they come from Corbis’s stock of 70 million pictures. He
likes sunsets and pictures to do with the Second World War, golf, sailing and Nobel Prize
winners.”165 The possibility of viewing beautifully digitized artwork in this fashion is an
amazing triumph for visual technologies. Indeed, “[t]he commodification of images of
public domain works of art makes it possible for us to adorn our every day lives with
images of fine art.” Interestingly, most ‘fine art’ images on the Corbis website, like the
Mona Lisa mentioned above, and such as a Modigliani painting of his wife, stipulate that
the image is not available for display on big screen media. It is my hope that this kind of
restriction will remain intact.
As an individual who has had the opportunity to work at museums, an auction
house, and an image bank, I believe that most, if not all, individuals affiliated with these
entities desire a copyright and DRM scheme that satisfies the interests of all parties. I
also believe that the conversation could be fleshed out insofar as artists themselves are
concerned; it is essential to keep an artist’s moral rights a substantial part of the
discussion, since they are the people whose creativity is exploited (in terms of dollars) or
exhibited (in terms of allowing the public to enjoy their creations).
VI.

Conclusion
The foundational contention woven throughout the whole of this writing is that

the copyright equation is not a horizontal one between rights holders and the public.
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There is also an inherent element of the equation that should guarantee that artists retain
some measure of control over their creations. Copyright has long been available to give
rights holders the ability to prevent unauthorized uses of their content. Standing alone,
the law cannot prevent illicit uses, regardless of whether they are undertaken unfairly or
legitimately.166 In other words, “the moral content and legitimacy of a digital copyright
regime will depend on the perception that the law is obeyed.”167 The ultimate aim of
using technical measures to manage delivery of intellectual property must be “to balance
the requirements of rights owners to control and protect the distribution of content with
the interest of consumers to have access to that content…unless copyright is to be
abandoned as a mechanism for trading in intellectual property entirely, it will be essential
to find an answer to this paradox.”168 The scope of copyright protection still varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. “Confronted with this legal diversity and the technical ease
for infringement offered by digital media, copyright holders [and artists themselves] may
be reluctant to make protected material available on-line.”169
I propose that international copyright law is fragmented and will remain so in the
immediate future. As was noted almost ten years ago: “Copyright from its historic
beginnings centered around works of literature and art in the traditional sense of the
word; moral rights have been developed with this in mind…we must adapt our positions
to the new situation, in order to save the principle as such.”170 While an eventual
international plan may eventually come into being, the balance between rightsholders and
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consumers must be equated while taking into account the substantial rights of the original
authors, whether they hold the economic-based copyright or not, and therein lies a very
difficult equation to balance on the international scale. Moral rights are not dead yet, and
it is incumbent upon current policymakers to balance the copyright equation between
rights holders, end-users, and, quite importantly, artists.
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